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Establishing an information-theoretic secret key between two parties using a quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) system is only possible when an accurate characterization of the quantum channel
and proper device calibration routines are combined. Indeed, security loopholes due to inappropri-
ate calibration routines have been shown for discrete-variable QKD. Here, we propose and provide
experimental evidence of an attack targeting the local oscillator calibration routine of a continuous-
variable QKD system. The attack consists in manipulating the classical local oscillator pulses
during the QKD run in order to modify the clock pulses used at the detection stage. This allows the
eavesdropper to bias the shot noise estimation usually performed using a calibrated relationship.
This loophole can be used to perform successfully an intercept-resend attack. We characterize the
loophole and suggest possible countermeasures.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
The two communicating parties of a quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) protocol [1], Alice and Bob, can in prin-
ciple share an information-theoretic secret key after the
exchange of a large number of quantum signals through
a physical channel, known as quantum channel, which
is subject to eavesdropping, and additional information
sent on a public but authenticated classical channel. Af-
ter Alice and Bob have agreed on a set of non-commuting
quantum operators, they can safely encode the key into
these variables: any eavesdropping attempt disturbs the
transmitted quantum states and is discovered after ran-
dom sampling of a fraction of Alice and Bob’s correlated
data. However, deviations of the practical implementa-
tion of a QKD protocol from the underlying theoretical
model can be exploited by an eavesdropper.
In most commonly used QKD systems, the key infor-
mation is encoded on discrete variables, such as the polar-
ization of a single photon, and thus specific components
for single-photon detection are required. Exploiting im-
perfections of such devices has led to powerful attacks,
namely the time-shift attack [2], the phase-remapping
attack [3], and the remote control of single-photon detec-
tors using tailored bright illumination [4]. Other attacks
proposed against discrete-variable QKD systems include
Trojan horse [5], device calibration [6], and wavelength
dependent beamsplitter [7] attacks. The latter have also
been adapted to continuous-variable QKD (CVQKD),
where the key information is encoded on continuous vari-
ables [8], such as the quadratures of coherent states [9].
In CVQKD systems, measurements are performed us-
ing standard coherent detection techniques, in particu-
lar homodyne detection when the protocol requires the
measurement of a single quadrature of the electromag-
netic field or heterodyne detection when both quadra-
tures need to be measured. Wavelength dependent beam-
splitter attacks targeting CVQKD schemes using hetero-
dyne detection have recently been studied [10, 11]. Fi-
nally, attacks specific to CVQKD [12, 13] typically in-
volve manipulation of the power of the local oscillator,
which is the phase reference classical signal required for
the coherent detection and is usually sent from Alice to
Bob together with the quantum signal [14].
Here, we consider device calibration attacks against
continuous-variable QKD. These attacks arise from a
subtle link between the local oscillator calibration pro-
cedure and the clock generation procedure in practical
CVQKD setups using Gaussian modulation of coherent
states and homodyne detection. We show that combining
this security loophole with intercept-resend attacks can
compromise the security of continuous-variable QKD in
the absence of appropriate countermeasures. With re-
cent advances in this technology, which allows for long-
distance key distribution using standard telecommuni-
cation components and with strong security guarantees
[14], assuring the practical security of all aspects of the
implementation, and specifically of the ubiquitous cali-
bration procedure, is of great importance.
II. SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS AND
CALIBRATION TECHNIQUES
A standard assumption when designing and imple-
menting a CVQKD system is that the local oscillator
cannot be manipulated by an eavesdropper. This can-
not, however, be verified in practice since the local oscil-
lator is a classical, and therefore intense, signal, and thus
the no-cloning theorem does not apply. This means that
the local oscillator can be measured and regenerated, or
directly amplified, without adding any additional distur-
bance.
Current security proofs do not explicitly take into ac-
count the local oscillator, which is not required at a
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Figure 1: Local oscillator experimental measurement proce-
dure. Here a PIN photodiode at the entrance of Bob’s setup
is used for two purposes: generating a clock on Bob’s side and
generating a signal proportional to the local oscillator power.
theoretical level to define the exchanged states and the
performed measurements [15–17]. In particular, all the
quantities that are used in the calculation of the secret
key generation rate are expressed in shot noise units.
Knowledge of the shot noise is therefore required. In
principle, the shot noise variance can be evaluated using
a balanced homodyne detector, as the variance of the in-
terference between the local oscillator and the vacuum
mode. This measurement method incurs some statistical
uncertainty due to the finite size of the data, as was stud-
ied in [18]. Alternatively, the linear relationship between
the variance of this measurement and the input power of
the local oscillator signal on the homodyne detector can
be used to estimate the shot noise during the quantum
transmission, provided that the local oscillator power is
known.
A standard calibration technique, used for instance in
[19], consists in establishing in a secure laboratory, before
the QKD run, the aforementioned linear relationship be-
tween the shot noise and the local oscillator power. Dur-
ing the QKD run, the local oscillator power is measured
either with a power meter or with a photodiode followed
by an integration circuit, at the input of Bob’s site. In
either case, a signal proportional to the intensity of the
local oscillator over a time period that should be equal to
the homodyne detection integration window is available.
The previously established linear relationship can then
be used to deduce the shot noise level used for the secret
key rate calculation. This approach, however, has two
shortcomings. First, it is not possible to trust the power
of the signal entering Bob’s device, since an eavesdrop-
per can easily add another classical signal (for instance,
at a different wavelength) into the quantum channel. Sec-
ond, in a practical CVQKD system, the local oscillator
is not only used as an intense signal coherent with the
weak quantum signal and therefore allowing to measure
its quadratures; it is also used to generate the clock sig-
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Figure 2: (a) Profile of the trigger signal generated at Bob’s
site depending on the shape of the local oscillator pulse. (b)
Differential signal obtained by the homodyne detector for sev-
eral modulated quadratures. After an integration period of
∆ = 100 ns, the capacitor discharges exponentially. Depend-
ing on the time of the measurement, the variance of the mea-
surement of the homodyne detection is different.
nal that is necessary to perform the measurements, as
shown in Fig. 1. Therefore, the local oscillator signal
can be suitably modified by an eavesdropper such that
the trigger signal generated by the clock circuit is also
altered.
In the following, we describe how the interplay between
the local oscillator calibration and the clock generation
procedures can be exploited to perform an eavesdropping
attack.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE LOCAL
OSCILLATOR CALIBRATION ATTACK
The basic principle of the attack is illustrated in Figs.
2 and 3. In particular, as shown in Fig. 2(a), the clock
circuit is usually designed to output a rising trigger sig-
nal when the intensity entering the photodiode is above
a certain threshold. Subsequently, this trigger is delayed
such that the value of the signal at the output of the ho-
modyne detection is maximized. A potential attack for
an eavesdropper consists in attenuating the beginning of
the local oscillator pulse, which induces a delay of the
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Figure 3: (Color online) In red, the calibrated linear relation-
ship between the variance of the homodyne detection mea-
surements and the local oscillator power. In green, the linear
relationship we obtain when delaying the trigger of the homo-
dyne detection by 10 ns.
trigger used for the measurements. Note that this was
also suggested in [20] as a potential source of loophole.
Figure 3 shows experimental results illustrating the re-
lationship between the variance of the measurement on
the homodyne detection and the local oscillator power
for different trigger signals. These results were obtained
using the setup of Fig. 1, which corresponds to a sim-
plified version of Bob’s setup employed for long-distance
continuous-variable QKD using Gaussian modulation of
coherent states [14]. The experiment shows that a de-
layed trigger results in a decrease of the detection re-
sponse slope. This is because a homodyne measurement
is usually performed by integrating the differential pho-
tocurrent during a period ∆ using an integrator circuit:
after this period ∆, the capacitor discharges exponen-
tially, which implies that the maximum measurement
variance is obtained when the trigger coincides with the
end of the period ∆, as shown in Fig. 2(b). As a result, if
Alice and Bob use the previously calibrated relationship
to evaluate the shot noise based on the measured local
oscillator power, they will use a false value, if the trigger
signal has been delayed during the QKD run. In partic-
ular, they will overestimate the value of the shot noise,
and consequently underestimate the excess noise present
in the setup. This creates an important loophole in the
security of the implementation.
Based on this loophole, we propose the following prac-
tical attack. It is important to note that this attack can
be implemented with current technology, without any
need, for instance, for a quantum memory.
• The eavesdropper, Eve, introduces a phase-
independent attenuator in the quantum channel
and applies an attenuation factor α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)
on a fraction ν (0 ≤ ν ≤ 1) of the local oscillator
pulses in order to modify their shape. The trigger
used to perform the homodyne measurement rela-
tive to these pulses is delayed by δ.
• Eve introduces a beam splitter in the quantum
channel and for a fraction µ (0 ≤ µ ≤ 1) of
the input signal pulses she measures both quadra-
tures and prepares the appropriate quantum state,
whereas for a fraction 1−µ of the input signal pulses
she just eavesdrops using the beamsplitter. This
so called partial intercept-resend attack was imple-
mented experimentally in [21].
When Eve increases the fraction µ of signal pulses over
which she performs an intercept-resend attack, she intro-
duces more noise, which lowers the amount of secret key
that Alice and Bob can extract from the quantum trans-
mission. The fraction ν of local oscillator pulses atten-
uated by Eve and the attenuation factor α are two free
parameters that play the same role: they scale the vari-
ance of the measurements made by Bob while his shot
noise estimation remains unchanged. This leads Alice
and Bob to conclude that no noise has been introduced
in the quantum channel and hence they establish a key
without detecting the presence of Eve.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EXCESS NOISE
To assess the impact of our attack on the security of
continuous-variable QKD, we detail the parameter esti-
mation procedure that is necessary for the derivation of
the secret key and how this procedure is altered when the
attack is implemented. In a practical CVQKD setup, Al-
ice and Bob estimate the quantities required to compute
the secret key rate by sampling m = N − n couples of
correlated variables (xi, yi)i=1...m, where N is the total
number of quantum signals sent through the quantum
channel and n is the number of signals used for the key
establishment. Since for CVQKD it is sufficient to esti-
mate the covariance matrix of the state shared by Alice
and Bob, the only parameters that need to be estimated
are the variance on Alice’s and Bob’s sites, 〈x2〉 and 〈y2〉,
respectively, and the covariance between Alice and Bob,
namely 〈xy〉 (assuming here that x and y are centered
variables, that is, that 〈x〉 = 〈y〉 = 0). Then, the follow-
ing estimators are used during the QKD run:
〈x2〉 = VA, 〈xy〉 =
√
ηTVA (1)
〈y2〉 = ηTVA +N0 + ηTξ + vel (2)
In the above expressions, T is the quantum channel trans-
mittance, VA is the modulation variance, ξ is the excess
noise, N0 is the shot noise, η is the efficiency of the ho-
modyne detector, and vel is the electronic noise (all ex-
pressed in their respective units).
Here we assume that the electronic noise does not
change between the QKD run and the calibration proce-
dure. In theory, an eavesdropper may also try to modify
the value of the electronic noise, for example by changing
the temperature operating conditions of the electronic
circuit of the homodyne detection between the calibra-
tion and the QKD run. However, the impact of such
4an attack would be less significant since the value of the
electronic noise is typically between 10 and 20 dB below
the shot noise.
In order to compute confidence intervals for these pa-
rameters, we consider a normal model for Alice and Bob’s
correlated variables (xi, yi)i=1...m, namely y = tx + z,
where t =
√
ηT ∈ R, and z follows a centered normal
distribution with unknown variance σ2 = N0 +ηTξ+vel.
Note that this normal model is an assumption justified in
practice but not by current proof techniques, which show
that the Gaussian assumption is valid once the covariance
matrix is known [17].
Maximum-Likelihood estimators tˆ, σˆ2 and VˆA are
known for the normal linear model:
tˆ =
∑m
i=1 xiyi∑m
i=1 x
2
i
, σˆ2 =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(yi − tˆxi)2, VˆA = 1
m
m∑
i=1
x2i
These are independent estimators with distributions:
tˆ ∼ N
(
t,
σ2∑m
i=1 x
2
i
)
,
mσˆ2
σ2
,
mVˆA
VA
∼ χ2(m− 1),
where t, σ2 and VA are the true values of the parame-
ters. Using the previous estimators and their confidence
intervals together with the shot noise value from the cal-
ibration N ′0, it is then possible to estimate T = tˆ
2/η and
ξ = (σˆ2 −N ′0 − vel)/tˆ2.
If the eavesdropper can change the slope of the ho-
modyne detection response as previously explained, the
equality N ′0 = N0 is not verified. This leads to the fol-
lowing estimation for the excess noise when a calibration
attack occurs:
ξˆcalib = ξˆ +
N
′
0 −N0
tˆ2
, (3)
where ξˆ is the estimate without the attack. In order
to compute a secret key rate, the excess noise must be
expressed in shot noise units, hence we have:
ξˆcalib
N ′0
=
N0
N ′0
[
ξˆ
N0
+
1
tˆ2
(
1− N
′
0
N0
)]
(4)
Next, we consider the excess noise introduced by a par-
tial intercept-resend (PIR) attack alone. According to
the analysis of [21], in this case, the probability distribu-
tion of Bob’s measurements is the weighted sum of two
Gaussian distributions with a weight of µ for the inter-
cepted and resent data and a weight of 1 − µ for the
transmitted data:
〈y2〉IR = ηT (VA + 2N0) +N0 + ηTξ + vel (5)
〈y2〉BS = ηTVA +N0 + ηTξ + vel, (6)
where ξ is the technical excess noise of the system. The
excess noise introduced by this attack can then be com-
puted as:
ξˆPIR = ξˆ + 2µN0 (7)
In practice, when a full intercept-resend attack is imple-
mented (µ = 1), the excess noise is dominated by the
second term in the above expression due to the noise in-
troduced by Eve’s measurements.
If, additionally, the eavesdropper performs the local
oscillator calibration attack, then the excess noise intro-
duced by the partial intercept-resend attack is computed,
in shot noise units, as:
ξˆPIRcalib
N ′0
=
N0
N ′0
[
ξˆPIR
N0
+
1
tˆ2
(
1− N
′
0
N0
)]
(8)
V. A QUANTITATIVE EXAMPLE
When the eavesdropper implements a full intercept-
resend attack (µ = 1), and with a typical value of
ξ/N0 = 0.1, we find from Eq. (7) that the noise intro-
duced by the attack is ξPIR/N0 = 2.1. This noise value is
above the entanglement breaking limit, hence no secret
key can be exchanged, independently of the communica-
tion distance. However, if Eve implements additionally
the local oscillator calibration attack, then Alice and Bob
will estimate the excess noise using Eq. (8). For exam-
ple, for a transmission T = 0.5 and a homodyne detection
efficiency η = 0.5, we find:
ξˆPIRcalib
N ′0
=
N0
N ′0
[
2.1 +
1
0.5× 0.5
(
1− N
′
0
N0
)]
(9)
Then, forN
′
0/N0 ≈ 1.5, which is a realistic value as shown
in Fig. 3, the excess noise estimated by Alice and Bob
will be close to zero, hence they will conclude they can
share a secret key. The security of the protocol is thus
entirely compromised.
VI. COUNTERMEASURE: REAL-TIME SHOT
NOISE MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES
In practice, it is possible to show that a calibrated lin-
ear relationship between the shot noise level and local os-
cillator power cannot be used in the presence of an eaves-
dropper (see Appendix for a detailed analysis). There-
fore, a countermeasure for the proposed attack consists
in devising techniques allowing to measure the shot noise
in real time. One such technique consists in applying a
strong attenuation on Bob’s signal path to a randomly
chosen set of pulses, using, for instance, an optical switch
or an amplitude modulator. Alternatively, an additional
homodyne detector dedicated to the real-time shot noise
measurement can be used: a beam splitter is introduced
in Bob’s local oscillator path and the relative sensitivity
of the two homodyne detectors is calibrated. A schematic
representation of the two techniques is shown in Fig. 4.
In both methods, two noise measurements on two sets
of pulses alow to extract the shot noise and the signal
5noise by inverting a linear system. To the best of our
knowledge, none of these techniques has been proposed
or implemented in CVQKD.
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(a)Real-time shot noise measurement using an
amplitude modulator on Bob’s signal path.
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Figure 4: Real-time shot noise measurement procedures pro-
tecting a CVQKD system against a local oscillator calibration
attack.
In Fig. 5, we compare the theoretical secret key rates
against collective attacks [15, 16] for a CVQKD system
that does not implement any countermeasure against the
local oscillator calibration attack we proposed and for a
system that uses the countermeasure of Fig. 4(a) with
an optical switch on Bob’s signal path. In the latter case,
the impact of the countermeasure on the secret key rate
is twofold. First, the number of pulses that can be used
to extract a secret key is diminished by the fraction of
pulses chosen at random to compute an estimate of the
shot noise; in our numerical analysis, we chose to dis-
card 10% of the pulses. Second, the efficiency of Bob’s
measurement apparatus η is reduced because of the 2.7
dB losses introduced by the optical switch. For realistic
values of all the parameters, we find that the maximum
secure distance drops from 80 km to 70 km when imple-
menting this countermeasure.
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Figure 5: (Color online) Secret key rate for collective attacks
in the asymptotic regime. Both plots are obtained in the so-
called realistic model where the electronic noise and the effi-
ciency of the homodyne detection are calibrated and cannot
be altered by the eavesdropper. The upper plot corresponds
to the secret key rate computed without implementing any
countermeasure against the local oscillator calibration attack.
The lower plot is obtained when inserting an optical switch
with typical losses of 2.7 dB on Bob’s signal path and discard-
ing 10% of the pulses on Bob’s side at random to perform a
real-time shot noise measurement. The transmittance T and
distance d are linked with the expression T = 10−αd/10, where
α = 0.2 dB/km is the loss coefficient of the optical fiber. The
modulation variance of Alice VA is adjusted to maintain a
signal-to-noise ratio of 0.075 on Bob’s side, which allows for
a reconciliation efficiency of β = 94.8% [14]. The excess noise
on Bob’s side is ξBob = 0.001, and the electronic noise of the
homodyne detection is vel = 0.01. For the upper plot, the
efficiency of the homodyne detection is assumed to be η = 0.6
while the lower plot corresponds to an efficiency ηcalib = 0.32
when taking into account the losses of the optical switch on
Bob’s signal path.
VII. CONCLUSION
We propose a powerful and realistic calibration attack
for continuous-variable QKD systems, by which an eaves-
dropper can make Alice and Bob negotiate a key even
for an introduced noise that is above the entanglement
breaking limit at which no secret key can be exchanged
at any distance. Preventing this attack involves real-
time measurement of the shot noise, which is possible but
not trivial. Given the relevance of CVQKD technology
for high-performance secure communications, this work
highlights the importance of rigorously testing the prac-
tical security of current implementations.
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Appendix A: Local oscillator power measurement
and clock signal generation
Here, we discuss the feasibility of measuring the local
oscillator power and generating a trigger signal from the
local oscillator without compromising the security of the
system.
Reasonable trigger generation functions are of the fol-
lowing form:
U1(t) = 1s(t−r)>x (A1)
U2(t) = 1s(t−r)−s(t−r−δ)>0 (A2)
The function U1 outputs a positive value at time t if and
only if the signal measurement is above the threshold
value x at time t − r. This corresponds to detecting
the beginning of a pulse (when its value is above the
threshold x) and then delaying the trigger with a chosen
delay r. The function U2 outputs a positive value at
time t if and only if the difference between the signal
and the signal delayed of one pulse duration δ is positive.
This presents the advantage of being independent from
the signal level but requires to know the pulse duration
δ. This cannot be assumed in the context of an active
eavesdropper. Both U1 and U2 are of the form 1φ(s)
where φ is a linear functional of the signal.
Reasonable power measurement functions are of the
following form:
P =
∫ δ
0
s(t− s)α−sds (A3)
where α is some nonnegative integration constant. P is
a linear form of the local oscillator signal. Since P is not
a multiple of φ for the trigger examples above, there are
signals that can be added to the local oscillator signal
that do not change the output of P but that change φ.
A closer look to this problem shows that it is indeed
possible to change Ui, i = 1 or 2, without changing P .
A simple example is given in Fig. 6. Both local oscil-
lator pulses have the same energy but the rising time of
the trigger does not coincide with the end of the pulse.
This analysis shows that, in practice, a calibrated lin-
ear relationship between the shot noise level and local
oscillator power cannot be used in the presence of an
eavesdropper, who will always be able to modify the lin-
ear relationship during the QKD run.
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Figure 6: (Color online) This figure shows how two pulses
of same energy generate two different trigger signals of rising
time t1 and t2.
